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In the SupreiDe Court
of the State of Utah
PHERRELL DRAPER,
Plaintiff ~and
Resporndent,
Case No.

vs.

J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC., A corpora-

7214

tion,
D·efiendant ·and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PherreU Draper, respondent here was plaintiff
below and J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., a corporation,
appellant here was defendant below. In stating the facts,
the parties will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant,
respectively.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At all times mentioned in his complaint, plaintiff
was the owner in fee and in possession of the land described in his complaint, and Old MiH Tavern, Inc., a
Utah corporation owned or claimed to own land adjoining plaintiff's, and by virtue of certain invalid tax deeds,
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it claimed to own plaintiff's land. To test the validity
of these tax deeds, it filed an action against plaintiff
praying that title to said land be quieted in it. Plaintiff
joined rssue and tria'l was had thereon. A decree was
entered declaring the tax deeds to be invalid and title
to the property was quieted in plaintiff.
But while said action was pending, Old Mill Tavern
made, executed and delivered to defendant, herein, a
mortgage encumbering plaintiff's said land. (See paragraphs 5 of both the complaint and answer herein.)
Plaintiff knew nothing of this mortgage until long
after it was put of record when his financial necessities
impelled him to offer the land as security for a loan.
Extension of his abstract in 1947 to satisfy his prospective lender that his title was good, disclosed this
mortgage to him for the first time. (Tr. pp. 7, 18, 35
and 36)
Upon discovery of said mortgage plaintiff prepared
a release thereof to he signed by defendant which he delivered to defendant with a demand that it execute the
same. Both the release and the demand were turned over
to Mr. Burton, defendant's counsel, and plaintiff was
directed to deal with him concerning the matter. (Tr.
p.16)
Accordingly, he saw Mr. Burton and told him of his
demands for a release, whereupon Mr. Burton told him
if he would sign an agreement and have a surveyor
survey
line
within
60bydays
he
would
get Services
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a release. Plaintiff responded that the mortgage had
no right on the property and that he did not feel disposed
to incur any obligation to get a release. (Tr. p. 20)
No claim was ever made that the mortgage had any
validity. The answer admits ownership and possession
of the mortgaged land in plaintiff and disclaims any
interest therein. At the trial defendant, through its attorney, made this statement :
''In any event we make no claim for the
validity of the mortgage on the property he described here.'' ( T. p. 37)
The nature of the obligation sought to be imposed
upon plaintiff for the execution of a release is fully disclosed by statements made to plaintiff at the trial, in the
form of questions by Mr. Burton, and by his sworn testimony when he took the stand on behalf of defendant, and
by defendant's Ex. 2, as follows:

Q. When you first came to my office, Mr.
Draper, we had a map of the Cottonwood
area where your property and the Old Mill
Property meets, did we not~
A. Wehadamap.

Q. We had a discussion as to this adjoining line
between yours and the property of the Old
Mill, didn't we.
A. We had a discussion on that, but I don't recaH the map. (T. p. 26)

Q. In fact you said you knew you were encroach-
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ing over on the Old Mill property the way
you were using your property at that time?
A. No, I never made that statement. (T. p. 27)
Q. Well, when you first came in, you were advised we wanted to have a dividing line by the
fence corrected to meet what any survey
showed?
A. I never made the statement I would correct
the line. (T. p. 28)
Q. I told you the only thing Mr. Walker wanted
was to have the connecting line, the property
line between the two of you adjusted.
A. Yes, you told me that. ('T. p. 29)
Q. And that if your fence was too far on your
side that it could he moved over; if it was
over on the Old Mill side, that it be moved to
correspond to the line, that is all we were
asking.
A. You asked me that, and I refused. (T. p. 32)
Mr. Burton's direct testimony:
''I was directed to deliver the relea,se upon
the securing of an agreement to correct the fence
lines to a survey which was to be had. In a discussion in the office with the plaintiff, I explained
that there was some question as to the fence lines
between the two, it appearing to the defendant
that there was an encroachment upon their lands,
on the lands of the Old Mill Corporation, and they
felt that the lines should he adjusted." (T. p. 54)
Ex. 2 is a proposed agreement between plaintiff and
defendant, prepared by defendant, in which defendant
asserts ownership of land adjoining plaintiff's, on the
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5
Failing to get a release without incurring an obligation, therefor, plaintiff brought this suit.

THE ISSUES
Appellant cites 15 errors committed by the Court
below raising the follo-wing questions:
1. Does plaintiff's complaint state a cause of

action?
2. Did the court exceed its powers or discretion
in allowing the prayer of the complaint to be
amended1
3. Was plaintiff entitled to an order requiring
defendant to release the mortgage 1
4. Is plaintiff entitled to damages and costs~·

ARGUMENT
1. Defendant demurred generally and specially to
plaintiff's complaint and also moved to strike all of
paragraph 9 thereof. The demurrer was overruled and
the motion to strike denied. This is assigned as error,
but all that is argued as error in defendant's brief is
that under Section 78-3-8 of our statutes, plaintiff may
not avail himself of both remedies therein provided. It
is then categorically stated that plaintiff "may sue for
double damages or he may sue to have the mortgage
released and all damages from such failure, or he could
sue in equity to quiet title against the land."

That the "complaint was fatally defective and did
not state a cause of action to permit the recovery of any
relief other than that of quieting title, because there is
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nowhere contained in the complaint any allegation that
the mortgage has been satisfied."
That the "defendant was unable to determine from
plaintiff's complaint which of the two causes of action
provided by 78-3-8 the plaintiff was pursuing or whether
an action only to quiet title." Appellant's Brief-No authority, except Section 78-3-8 is cited to support the foregoing statements.
Our Code of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint must contain provisions as follows:
"A statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action in ordinary and concise language.
A demand for relief which the plaintiff claims.
If the recovery of money or damage is demanded, the amount must be stated." 104-7-2
U.C.A. 1943
Section 104-30-5 provides that any relief consistent
with the case made by the complaint and embraced within
the issues may be granted.
Plaintiff's complaint in substance alleges that he
was and is the owner in fee and in possession of certain
land and had been for a long time.
That Old Mill Tavern placed of record certain invalid tax deeds affecting plaintiff's land and then brought
suit to quiet title to said 'land; that defendant joined
I
issue in said suit, and while that action was pending the
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7
gage on the land involved in the action, knowing or
charged with knowledge, that Old ~lill had no title to
the land, and that they willfully and wrongfully cloude,d
plaintiff's title by recording said mortgage; that the
court in said action decreed the tax deeds to be invalid;
that plaintiff knew nothing of said mortgage until after
the conclusion of said action when he sought a loan on
the land and had his abstract continued for that purpose;
that he demanded of defendant that it release or cancel
said mortgage of record, which defendant refused to do;
that plaintiff suffered certain 'specified damage because
of said refusal, in the total sum of $547.00.
Plaintiff's prayer is as follows:
"Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment against
defendant adjudging and decreeing that the mortgage aforesaid is null and void and of no effect
and for an order requiring defiendant bo rele,ase
said mortgage of recotrd insofar as it affects the
title to the property aforesaid, and for judgment
awarding plaintiff his costs herein expended and
for damages in the 'SUm of $547.00." (Italics supplied).
Paragraph 9 of the complaint sets the damage forth
in detail. Defendant moved to strike this paragraph and
demurred generally to the whole complaint and specially
to allegations concerning a warranty to Henry L. Butler,
and to allegations concerning the placing of ~150.00 securing with a loan company against the cloud of said mortgage.
The italicized words of the prayer were not in the
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prayer at the time the demurrer and motion to 'Strike was
ruled on, but were allowed as an amendment at the beginning of the trial.
It is submitted now that neither the demurrer or the
motion to strike have any merit; nor has the objection
made to the amendment any merit.
Defendant elected not to stand on its demurrer and
motion, or to appeal therefrom. Instead it answered and
made its case at the trial. Whatever error, if any, was
made in ruling on the pleadings were cured by defendant's answer and by the facts presented by it at the
trial.
The answer admitted the ownership and possession
of plaintiff, and it admitted the invalidity of the mortgage and the invalidity of the tax deeds upon which it
was predicated. It also admitted the making and taking
and recording of the mortgage by Old Mill Tavern and
defendant while an action was pending to test the validity
of the tax deed. (See paragraphs 1 to 6 of the complaint
and answer.)
At the trial, J. B. Walker was shown to be an officer
of defendant company (Tr. p. 8); and the testimony
quoted above in the Statement of Fact discloses that
he acted for the Old Mill Tavern as one who had full
authority to do so. That testimony and the admissions
in the answer disclose that at the time plaintiff made his
demand for release of the mortgage both Old :Mill Tavern and defendant knew that mortgage, made and recorded
them
while
anforaction
determine
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9
ownership of the land, was absolutely null and void. It is
further disclosed by compelling and legitimate inference
therefrom, that the interests of Old l\1iH and defendant
with respect to said mortgage are the same.
Not only was the mortgage made and recorded un~er
the circumstances above set forth, but when a release
was demanded, plaintiff was shown a map where the
property of plaintiff and Old Mill meet, and plaintiff
was charged with saying that he knew -that he was ''encroaching over on the Old Mill Pr:operty. Plaintiff was
advised that 'we' want 'a dividing line by the fence corrected to meet what any survey showed,'' plaintiff to
bear the cost of the survey. Who ''we'' are is drsclosed
in the following statements quoted and cited above:
"I told you (plaintiff) the only thing Mr. Walker
wanted was to have the connecting line, between you two
adjusted, that if the fence was too far on your side, that
it could be moved over; if it was on the Old Mill side,
that it be moved to correspond to the line, that is all
we were asking. I was directed to deliver the release
upon the securing of an agreement to correct the fence
lines to a survey which was to be had. I explained that
there was some question as to the fence lines between
the two, it appearing to the dependamt that there was an
encroachment upon lheir lands; on the lands of the Old
Mill Corporation, and they felt that the lines should be
adjusted.'' (Italics supplied.)
In addition, defendant asserts ownership of the land
adjoining plaintiff in its Exhibit 2.
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It seems to us that it would impugn the intelligence
of the court to spell out the meaning of the foregoing
language. It shows without attempted construction that
the interests of Old Mill and defendant with respect to
said mortgage are the same and that Mr. Walker spoke
for both of them.
Defendant complains that the cause of action was
changed by the amendment to the prayer of the complaint and deprived defendant of substantial rights.

J
I

A casual examination of the complaint will disclose
the absurdity of this contention. 'The complaint alleges
ownership and possession of the land at the time the
tax deeds and mortgage were recorded and became
clouds upon plaintiff's title. It further alleges that while
the Old Mill Tavern and plaintiff were engaged in a suit
in which plaintiff was challenging the validity of the tax
deeds, that the Old Mill and defendant willfully and
knowingly further clouded plaintiff's title by recording
the aforesaid mortgage.
The prayer of the complaint to which defendant
demurred was merely that the court decree the mortgage
to be null and void. If as matter of fact it was null and
void the plaintiff was entitled to such a decree and if
it was collusive and fraudulent, as a matter of right and
equity, plaintiff was entitled to have it expunged from
the record by a release or cancellation thereof.
Since said mortgage is on record in the name of the
defendant, it is the proper party to expunge the same
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damage for refusal to do so.
It is elementary doctrine that the prayer is not a
part of the complaint, and the defendant was required
to do nothing after the amendment to meet the allegations of the complaint than it could or did do after the
amendment.
But defendant cites section 78-3-8 U.C.A. 1943 and
argues that plaintiff is estopped there by to recover damages from defendant for refusal to expunge its void
mortgage from the records, on the theory that the common law did not allow damages for refusal to release a
mortgage, and that said statute gives the right of damages to a mortgagor only.
As authority for such doctrine defendant cites and
quotes from Hasquet v. Big West, 29 Fed. 2nd 58, and
Morrill v. Title 162, p. 360. The quote from the Morrill
case cannot be found in the text of the opinion found
at 162, p. 360. We assume, however, that the quote is
from some other good authority. Whatever case it comes
from it is authority for the doctrine that damages for
refusal to satisfy a mortgage may be had in an equity
action, and plaintiff's case is primarily an equity action
and was so tried without a jury.
Quoting from the real Morrill case, supra, it is made
to appear that damages were allowed in such cases even
at common law:
''The effect of the statute is to substitute
remedies. It postpones a right of action in the
interest of peace. It provides a certain recovery
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
in all cases in lieu of the uncertainty of the common law action."-162 P. 362.
It is our contention that under the facts and pleadings we are entitled to recover damages as a matter of
equity, but even if the statute applies it does not deny,
but merely defines and limits damages.
But, says respondent, if the statutes applies, plaintiff does not come within its provisions: first, because
there is no proof that the mortgage was ever paid or
satisfied, and second because only a mortgagor may avail
himself of the statute where only the mortgagor is named
as beneficiary thereof because such statutes must be
strictly construed and limited to operate only in favor
of those included in the statutory designation. Citing
and quoting from Hope v. United Savings, 60 P. 2nd, 737,
and Graham v. Sindergaard, 238 Mich. 210, 213 N.W. 200,
in support of these propositions. - Defendant's brief,
page------·
The first proposition is absurd because at the time
demand was made to expunge the record by a release
there was no n1ortgage obligation in existence. There
was nothing to satisfy; nothing to do but expunge from
the record a dead document with the appearance of life.
As to the second proposition, it ha·s already been
shown that the mortgagor and the mortgagee were one
and the same in interest so far as keeping the void
mortgage on record is concerned, and under no equitable
doctrine could it be said that they had a right to exact
from
plaintiff
a consideration
expunging
the records.
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Besides in not all cases has a strict construction of
such statutes been slavishly adhered to. At the trial we
cited, and now cite, the case of Van Doren v. Wolf
(Kans.), 211 P. 1-1-!, based on a statute giving, in terms,
only the mortgagor the right to damages upon refusal to
satisfy a mortgage, but based upon circumstances set
forth in the case they refused to follow the literal language of the statute and gave a non-mortgagor relief
under the statute.
In the instant case, defendants own authorities show
that equity may relieve such a situation, and if the statute applies at all, it applies only to limit and measure
plaintiff's damage.
We, therefore, conclude that the lower court committed no error and the judgment and decree should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
D. M. DRAPER,

AMorney for Plaintiff
rOIYIJd Respondent
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